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Abstract
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the assistance formula. Creditors’ cost-benefit considerations were key for retaining disincentives, a limited liability for
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Eurozone interests, debtors were able to push for an increase in assistance, an expansion of assistance into areas of bank-
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difficulties at hand.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Euro crisis, extraordinary
financial support in the Eurozone has been institution-
alised through new tools and bodies with significant fire-
power to assist Member States in difficulties. After a first
leap into this new area of Eurozone support with tempo-
rary assistance tools, Member States continued to adjust
the structure repeatedly through new rules and practices
and advanced deeper into the area of financial assistance
introducing a permanent Eurozone support mechanism
and instruments for bank recapitalisation, often subject
to intense negotiations between core EU countries.
Scholars have become interested in the negotiation
process finding explanatorymerit in the strategic interac-
tion between two ideational camps representing export
and demand-led states (Hall, 2014), in hard intergovern-
mental bargaining and brinkmanship between creditors
and debtors (Schimmelfennig, 2015), in the shift away
from market policy to the state’s core interest (Genschel
& Jachtenfuchs, 2018), or in the previous institutional
setting framing the choices at hand at the peak of the cri-
sis (Verdun, 2015). Puetter (2012) acknowledged that the
decision to govern new eras of EU activity was as much
driven by national interests as by the willingness to find
common solutions for common problems. These stud-
ies often account for complementary explanations but
emphasise different explanatory variables in the inter-
governmental process. Whereas strategic constructivists
find that the cause of action at EU-level in the gov-
ernments’ rationale is based on the ideational founda-
tion of their respective political economies (e.g., Hall,
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2014; Schäfer, 2016), more rational approaches empha-
sise the aggregate welfare cost-benefit consideration by
countries on the European level (e.g., Moravcsik, 2018;
Schimmelfennig, 2015, 2018).
Scholars find that the post-crisis governance struc-
ture has put the adjustment costs predominantly on the
economies of the countries receiving assistance with a
strong emphasis on austerity being the fruit of ordolib-
eral German politics (e.g., Blyth, 2013; Matthijs, 2016).
Scholars have emphasised the emergence of new for-
mats and intergovernmental solutions in the aftermath
of the crisis (Bickerton, Hodson, & Puetter, 2015), how-
ever, less attention has been given to the actual design of
financial assistance and its adjustment in the last decade.
This article complements these studies by emphasizing
the concrete adjustments occurring to the financial assis-
tance formula and the role Member States played in its
continuous development.
The research question set for this article is: How can
we best understand the last decade of Eurozone finan-
cial assistance reforms? As extraordinary financial assis-
tance has the potential to carry significant costs for par-
ticipating countries, the stakes in this policy are high,
justifying an approach centred around Member States’
interests and cost-benefit considerations in the design
of support. This approach distinguishes between the
potential roles of Member States in the different forms
of financial assistance mostly oriented along a creditor-
debtor divide. Whereas Germany and other potential
creditors repeatedly favoured an assistance formulawith
limited liabilities, cost reduction, high disincentives, and
the exclusion of bank support, France and other poten-
tial debtors favoured mutualisation of debt, low disin-
centives, and inclusion of bank support in the assis-
tance. Often the result of negotiations between these
two coalitions favoured the creditors’ design, shifting
the adjustment burden on potential receivers of assis-
tance. However, as debtors repeatedly had difficulties
adjusting, a continuous adaptation of the formula was
necessary in order to achieve the common interest of
Eurozone stability. This led to a tug of war between the
two camps over the adjustment burden and costs of
reform for each step of the way. It is argued that this
mixed preferences situation of common Eurozone inter-
ests and diverging interests along the creditor–debtor
divide explains best how the Eurozone reformed finan-
cial assistance.
In the following section, the theoretical frame-
work is presented. Section 3 describes the initial stage
of Eurozone financial assistance established in 2010.
Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the empirical analy-
sis on several issues related to financial assistance.
Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
This article borrows from liberal intergovernmentalism
by assessing the outcome of integration in the area
of financial assistance based on state preferences and
intergovernmental bargaining. Liberal intergovernmen-
talismbuilds on the assumptions that states are bounded
rational actors (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019), act-
ing according to their respective preferences with the
general objective of achieving the most preferred out-
come in the least costly way (Knight, 2018). Moravcsik
(1998) provides a three-stage framework for assessing
the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations. First,
states form their preferences domestically. This pro-
cess is dependent on the issue at hand and the respec-
tive constituency on the national level (Moravcsik &
Schimmelfennig, 2019). The more specialised a policy
and the smaller the number of stakeholders, the more
representative is the state’s position of a specific interest
group. Conversely, in a more general policy concerning a
diffused entirety of taxpayers, e.g., in macroeconomics,
the state represents the interests of its economy as a
whole. In the second stage, the states negotiate a com-
mon agreement. Liberal intergovernmentalism argues
that this process is dependent on the relative bargain-
ing power of states deriving from asymmetric interde-
pendence (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019), which
favours positions of stateswith low incentives to compro-
mise due to their expected lower gains from a common
solution (Moravcsik, 1993; Schimmelfennig, 2018). Lastly,
states find agreement in specific institutional choices.
This locks the agreement reached in a more or less fixed
manner and tends to favour the preferences of those
countries with the greatest leverage.
Additional to national preferences, this article con-
ceptualises common ‘Eurozone’ or ‘EU’ preferences
shared by all Eurozone members. This common EU or
Eurozone preference is the stability of the Eurozone
and the proper functioning of the common market,
which this article considers as fixed. The common inter-
ests derive from the interdependence of European
economies. The danger to the integrity of the Eurozone
through sovereign defaults or even the breakup of the
Eurozone would have devastating effects on European
economies and hence on the future stability of their
respective fiscal and economic positions. This creates
a situation of mixed preferences in which Member
States agree to resolve the difficulties at hand, but
disagree about the distribution of adjustment costs
(Scharpf, 1997; Zürn, 1992). In game theory, this situa-
tion is referred to as a “coordination game with distri-
butional conflict” (Wolf, 2002, p. 39). Scholars assessed
the moment of the Euro crisis as a situation of mixed
preferences, in which Member States shared the com-
mon preference of safeguarding the Euro, while in paral-
lel following diverging preference on the concrete form
of adjustment, which determined how the burden is split
among the states (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2019;
Schimmelfennig, 2015). In 2010, the German governing
coalition’s behaviour showcased the common interest as
it called this common or shared preference of Eurozone
stability alternativlos (unavoidable).
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Hence, while keeping the underlying interdepen-
dence from common preference on safeguarding the
Eurozone and the commonmarket inmind, this workwill
focus on the diverging preferences in the reform process.
Similar to previous studies on intergovernmental negoti-
ations, the diverging preferences are assessed based on
national cost-benefit considerations. These are depen-
dent on the expected adjustment costs linked to the
materialist burden associated with financial assistance
following a creditor–debtor divide (e.g., Copelovitch,
Frieden, & Walter, 2016; Schimmelfennig, 2018). In the
context of financial assistance, this cost-benefit analysis
is related to specific elements of assistance including the
scale, the timing, the source, the form, the control of
assistance and the disincentives attached to it. Finally,
this article emphasises the preferences of representative
core-states in the bargaining processes.
Financial assistance can be generally regarded as a
favourable loan or permanent transfer of capital to a
recipient. These loans or transfers bear different costs
for states depending on the assistance format and
the expected financial involvement. Member States are
expected to have entered into assistance negotiations
according to their shared preferences that some form of
financial assistance structure was needed or improved
and have shaped the development of the Eurozone assis-
tance structure according to the individual cost-benefit
consideration of their expected involvement.
In the following, this article will assess several
reforms to the financial assistance structure since the
Euro crisis using preferences, intergovernmental bargain,
and the institutional outcome.
3. The European Financial Assistance Formula
As the international financial crisis swept over to the
EU in 2008–2009, non-Eurozone countries received assis-
tance via the EU’s Balance of Payments assistance facility.
An instrument that borrowed via the EU on the market
and on-lend to states. For Eurozone countries, no assis-
tance tool existed from within the EU. To avoid uncer-
tain and potentially very high adjustment costs caused
by a systemic spill-over of a Greek default (Colasanti,
2016) and its potential negative signalling effect to the
market about the debt sustainability of other Eurozone
countries (Schimmelfennig, 2018), the Eurozone explic-
itly marked their common preference of Eurozone stabil-
ity and established several assistance tools (Council of
the EU, 2010; European Commission, 2010). First, the
Greek Loan Facility (GLF) was created as a fast ad-hoc
bilateral response to the Greek crisis with €80 billion
of support. In parallel Eurozone countries established
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), a tempo-
rary 3-year special purpose vehicle that could provide
loans to Eurozone members. The agreement on the EFSF
allowed for the lending of up to €440 billion and was
complemented by a Council regulation on the European
financial stabilisation mechanism (EFSM) that allowed
the EU to use its leftover financial margin as assistance
as long as the crisis prevailed (see Table 1).
This first firewall was a mix of a fast-paced response
to Greece’s imminent difficulties and a broader approach
to a potential future system of assistance. All assistance
was provided via loans, a fiscally neutral way in the
medium-term. Out of foresight on the costs of bilateral
assistance for other Eurozone countries, the EFSF was
Table 1. Assistance instruments adopted in 2010.
EFSM EFSF GLF Assistance formula
Guarantee Guarantees on the Individual guarantees Bilateral loans with Limited liability
structure EU budget by Eurozone Member individual share
States
Eligibility for Conditionality Conditionality Conditionality Disincentives
assistance
Decision-making Decision by Council Decision by Decision taken Member States’ control
Eurogroup nationally
Lender EU (intermediary), Eurozone Member States, Mix: No direct fiscal impact
expected €60 billion (intermediary), €80 billion for EFSM and EFSF and
€440 billion direct fiscal impact for GLF;
fiscally neutral in
medium-term;
Time limitation Implicit temporary 3 years Only once Temporary
(as long as exceptional
occurrence justifies
instrument)
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supposed to provide loans as an intermediary in the
same way the EU did through its Balance of Payments
assistance facility (European Stability Mechanism [ESM],
2019). This structure would prevent creditors from wors-
ening their fiscal position during a time of general eco-
nomic upheaval. Whereas the EU could in general fall
back on its own resources as collateral for lending
through the EFSM, the Eurozone countries had to pro-
vide guarantees for EFSF loans. This was achieved via a
contribution key and oversubscription (guarantees), stat-
ing the share and potential financial involvement of each
country in EFSF activity. The intended assistance formula
aimed at limited liabilities for creditors and for the low-
est possible cost, as the EU and the EFSF would lend as
an intermediary, sparing the countries the direct fiscal
impact of bilateral assistance.
Whereas the common interest of saving Greece and
establishing a rescue fund derived from contagion risks,
the EFSF followed a creditor-centred design. In particu-
lar, German and British national preferences on a non-EU
instrument for Eurozone support were the reason why
the Commission’s alternative of assistance exclusively
provided via the EU was ruled out (Gocaj & Meunier,
2013). Decision-making for assistance was in the hands
of the Member States and in the case of the EFSF
and GLF entirely based on national laws to ensure
legal certainty and control. For the EFSM, the Council
decided by qualified majority voting; for the GLF and
EFSF, Eurozone countries decided unanimously with sev-
eral Member States requiring approval from their par-
liaments. Assistance carried policy conditionality, which
was set as ‘strict’ including extensive austerity demands,
which intended to restore market confidence. These
instruments increased risk-exposure of potential creditor
states, but also favoured creditors’ preference of includ-
ing substantial obstacles to accessing assistance and to
rerouting debt in order to avoid direct costs.
4. The Fault in Our Assistance: EFSF Reform
This initial creditor-centred design unintentionally some-
what weakened the common interest of establishing a
support structure for Eurozone stability. Shortly after the
establishment of the EFSF, several issues arose as the
intended signalling effect to markets failed and market
tension continued to rise in the Eurozone in 2011.
First, in this context, the European Central Bank (ECB)
started its Securities Market Programme through which
it purchased over €200 billion worth of periphery coun-
tries’ government bonds on the secondary market (ECB,
2013). These interventions were contested within the
ECB’s Governing Council and by several Eurozone gov-
ernments (Howarth, 2012), as well as by German and
Dutchmembers of parliament (Fontan&Howarth, 2021).
The main dispute was about the ECB’s balance sheet
stretch, with bonds from countries under increased mar-
ket pressure. The intervention by the ECB effectively low-
ered the funding rate for these countries without them
having to undergo reforms to strengthen their economic
situation, which was seen by some as the root cause of
their fragile market position. This undermined to some
extent the previously set strict conditionality that usually
accompanied extraordinary assistance.
Second, the problematic relationship between banks
and sovereigns became palpable as debtor countries
required substantial funds from assistance instruments
because having rescued their banks they had signif-
icantly weakened their fiscal positions (Blyth, 2013;
Tooze, 2018). A large part of the loans to Ireland and
Greece were used to recapitalise banks, creating the sit-
uation in which the debtor countries had to substantially
increase their debt. This assistance came as conditional
loans, carrying strict provisions on economic reform,
as it was considered a national ex-post fiscal problem
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2015). However, contagion risks made
financial sector assistance a Eurozone issue.
Third, the EFSF-design had two flaws, which were
linked to its legal and its guarantee structure. The over-
subscriptions of the EFSFwere not enough to achieve the
sought-after high credit rating for the total amount of
€440 billion (it only achieved €250 billion). Meanwhile,
Eurostat decided that guarantees for assistance under
the EFSF had to be reported as government debt by the
creditors (Eurostat, 2011). The GLF and the rerouting
of EFSF debt had direct fiscal implications for creditor
states in the short and medium-term as their debt level
rose (Bundesrechnungshof, 2019). This went against the
intended assistance formula, which was supposed to
avoid direct national expenditure for assistance.
Fourth, the Eurozone used favourable, yet relatively
high, interest rates for assistance to Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal, in order to encourage swift reform implemen-
tation and hence a rapid return to the market (Colasanti,
2016; Pisani-Ferry, 2014). However, the intention to
incentivise structural reforms did not have the intended
effect. Creditors and European institutions did not suf-
ficiently consider the effect of assistance via loans and
their interest rates on debt sustainability. With this back-
ground, the Eurogroup decided to reform the EFSF and
“adopt furthermeasures [to] improve the euro area’s sys-
temic capacity to resist contagion risk” (Council of the
EU, 2011a).
The creditor countries, particularly Germany, pre-
ferred reforms to protect their rather stable fiscal posi-
tion and shield their taxpayers from assuming potential
costs from mutualised instruments. They preferred to
avoid being exposed to periphery states’ liabilities and
not to incur costs from rescuing periphery banks. Most
notably, they defended the use of policy conditionality
for any form of assistance in order to avoid moral hazard.
Furthermore, they favoured a legal structure with effec-
tive intermediary borrowing and lending to avoid further
increases of public debt through EFSF activities. Debtor
states, on the other hand, favoured an increase of the
EFSF firepower, a mutualisation of debt and lower inter-
est rates for support as their fiscal position worsened.
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Italy’s finance minister Tremonti called mutualisation of
debt the “master solution” to resolve the crisis (Hollinger,
Bryant, & Peel, 2011). France favoured ECB involvement
and pushed for EFSF leveraging via the ECB and a mutu-
alised system for bank recapitalisation (Carnegy, 2011).
In early 2011, the Eurozone agreed to use EFSF funds
for primary market purchases in order to allow strug-
gling states to maintain market access. Primary market
interventions were EFSF state loans with conditionality
applied through a different channel. This was intended
to reduce the amount of lending necessary as recipi-
ents would partially be able to fund themselves on the
market (Spiegel, 2012). This solution allowed Member
States to maintain control over the scale of the liabil-
ities they assumed via interventions in the debt mar-
kets. However, as the ECB acted in parallel on the sec-
ondary market, creditors saw risks rerouted onto their
central banks’ balance sheets. In Germany, the Securities
Market Programme was seen as the introduction of
common Eurozone debt via the backdoor of the ECB’s
balance sheet, which was guaranteed according to the
Eurozone’s capital key (Bundestag, 2011a).
To regain control of assistance and ensure proper
conditionality, the German coalition government con-
sidered a secondary market instrument for the EFSF,
not only as an additional supporting tool but also as
a replacement for uncontrolled ECB action (Bundestag,
2011b). Germany expected that Eurozone governments
would take over intervention on the secondary market
with conditionality, thus disarming the ECB and ensuring
government control over liabilities (Bundestag, 2011c).
A grandmajority of Germanmembers of parliament even
passed a motion stating that there was no further need
for the ECB’s Securities Market Programme (Bundestag,
2011d). The message was understood in the ECB and the
Securities Market Programme’s successor, the Outright
Monetary Transactions programme, explicitly pointed to
a parallel EFSF/ESMprogrammewith conditionality as eli-
gibility criteria for action (ECB, 2012). Primary and sec-
ondary market interventions were introduced to regain
control of targeted interventions on Eurozone debt mar-
kets and allowed the recipients, in theory, to maintain
market access.
Debtor countriesweremore concernedwith avoiding
adjustment costs of recapitalising their banks as none of
the assistance instruments were targeted directly at the
banking sector but functioned as loans to governments.
France favoured a solution of recapitalisation via the EFSF
(Pidd, 2011), whereas Germany preferred national solu-
tions (“Paris et Berlin,” 2011). Both countries eventually
agreed on a potential use of the EFSF as a last resort
for bank recapitalisation, as the market situation deteri-
orated and sovereign yields spreads increased consider-
ably, putting periphery countries’ debt sustainability at
risk (Bundesbank, 2011). The risk associated with a cas-
cade of defaults of periphery countries was immense and
foregrounded the common Eurozone interest of stability
preceding the negotiation on recapitalisation.
Together with the increase in the effective lending
capacity of the EFSF from €250 billion to 440 billion
(achieved by raising the guarantees), Member States
agreed on a common tool for bank recapitulation.
Creditors’ insistence on the established assistance for-
mula forced potential debtors to accept an indirect recap-
italisation instrument. This instrument worked as a state
loan, however, its conditionality was only targeted at the
financial sector reducing the stigma of a full programme
(ESM, 2017). Creditors refused to take over direct liabili-
ties for difficulties occurring in other countries’ banking
sectors. This increased the funds available but did not
ease the burden for potential debtors. Thus, the new
instrument did not effectively resolve the issue of wors-
ened fiscal positions due to bank bailouts.
The market turmoil in 2011 and the initial empha-
sis on disincentives by creditors in the form of strict
conditionality and favourable, yet impractical, lending
rates for GLF loans, brought Greece again to the brink
of default. Thus, Member States decided to lower the
interest rate for Greece and to lengthen the maturity of
its debt (Council of the EU, 2011b). The abolishment of
impractical rates for close-to-default countries was later
presented as an ‘impressive display of euro area solidar-
ity’ by the ESM’s managing director (ESM, 2020a). This
adjustment tempered the insistence on disincentives via
lending rates as the common Eurozone preference and
the potential risks and losses associated with a Greek
default were a much larger threat than the costs asso-
ciated with longer maturities and lower lending rates.
However, agreement to these relieve measures and a
substantial EFSF loan to Greece came again with ‘appro-
priate incentives to implement the programme’ (Council
of the EU, 2011c). This could not avoid a restructur-
ing of Greek debt held by the private sector in 2012
(Colasanti, 2016).
The future issue of counting debt as national expen-
diturewas resolved by defining the legal structure for the
in parallel negotiated design of the ESM, the successor of
the EFSF, as permanent international financial organisa-
tion allowing intermediary borrowing and lending (ESM,
2019; Eurostat, 2013). The capital structure of the ESM
was based on a similar logic as the EFSF, however, the
ESM included a significant share of paid-in capital, which
functioned as collateral togetherwith additional national
guarantees. When in late 2012 the ESM became opera-
tional, it absorbed all functions and instruments from the
EFSF and reset the effective lending capacity to €500 bil-
lion. The step towards the ESM was a rectification of the
faulty design of the EFSF’s legal structure and increased
the direct costs attributed to assistance via paid-in capi-
tal andmade the formula permanent to showcase a cred-
ible commitment. However, it significantly lowered the
states’ guarantees and achieved the major objective of
effective intermediary borrowing and lending easing the
potential creditors’ immediate burden.
The choice of reforms for the EFSF shows how
the resolution of the crisis was a situation of mixed
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preferences. Eurozone countries agreed on a way for-
ward to resolve the crisis and to achieve the common
interest of Eurozone stability by increasing the lending
capacity, lowering the costs for debtors and by introduc-
ing new instruments. While both, creditors and debtors,
tried to deflect adjustment costs in the detailed imple-
mentation of the assistance formula. Concessions made
by Germany and other creditors to include instruments
on market interventions and bank recapitalisation are
in detail dominated by a creditor-centred design of
the assistance formula. All instruments relied on the
same structure of conditional loans to states with lim-
ited liabilities, fiscal neutrality in the medium-term, and
intended intermediary borrowing and lending to avoid
direct costs.
5. Tug of War over ESM Reform and Banking Sector
Support
As the crisis progressed, scholars and experts pointed
towards the different pre-conditions that led Member
States to seek assistance. One of these aspects was the
sovereign doom loop. Arguably, this problem was made
worse via the ECB’s long-term refinancing operations in
2011 and 2012 as banks in Southern Europe accessed
ECB financing using government bonds as collateral
to buy new government bonds (Howarth & Quaglia,
2016). Another aspect was the previous use of assistance
by individual states and their banking sectors. Ireland
argued that it bared disproportionate costs of rescuing
banks and that the Eurozone should share the cost of
the Irish bailout as it reduced contagion risks for the
Eurozone (Smyth, 2011). As in 2012, Spain required sub-
stantial assistance to rescue its banks, it preferred to
receive recapitalisation for its banks, rather than a gov-
ernment loan, as it insisted that its problems were bank-
made (Minder, Kulish, & Geitner, 2012). However, cred-
itors relied on the assistance formula of loans to states.
It became apparent that in order to effectively break the
doom-loop and achieve Eurozone stability, bank recov-
ery and resolution was to be shifted away from the state
(van der Kwaak & van Wijnbergen, 2017).
This was acknowledged at a Euro summit in 2012.
Governments saw the advantage of direct recapitalisa-
tion and agreed on providing the ESM with the pos-
sibility of recapitalising banks directly in a first step
towards Banking Union. However, while France, Italy,
and Spain supported direct recapitalisation, Germany
and other creditor countries remained concerned about
legacy issues in periphery banks and feared that the costs
of losses, due to failure of nations to reform, would be
spread among the Eurozone countries. Germany also
feared a disadvantage for its alternative banking sec-
tor of corporate and savings banks (Commain, 2021;
Howarth & Quaglia, 2016). Debtor countries favoured
this instrument as it would lower their burden for
potential bailouts. Creditors insisted that the establish-
ment was coupled to progress in setting up the Single
Supervisory Mechanism to monitor banks and a liabil-
ity cascade to avoid disincentives for states to clean up
their banking sectors (Council of the EU, 2013a). These
demands were intended to prevent already struggling
bankswith legacy issues from tapping into the ESM funds
(Howarth & Quaglia, 2016).
Other ex-ante requirements were attached to assis-
tance including the threat to fiscal sustainability for the
country in which the banks were based, systemic rele-
vance of the bank in question, private creditor bail-in,
host Member State participation in bank recapitalisa-
tion, and the inclusion of institution-specific and poten-
tially general economic conditionality (Council of the EU,
2013b). In 2014, the Direct Recapitalisation Instrument
was added to the ESM toolkit (capped at €60 billion).
However, the above-mentioned requirements, mostly
due to creditors’ preference to avoid the moral haz-
ard and costs of bank bailouts, made its use less likely
as debtor states still had to bear most of the adjust-
ment costs ex-ante (Merler, 2014). The step from com-
mon assistance to sovereign states to assistance to banks
came with higher risks for creditors as loans to banks
were riskier than state loans (ESM, 2014). Thus, credi-
tors insisted that in this case, the formula should include
additional disincentiveswhich had the effect that the link
between sovereign states and banks was only superfi-
cially cut.
A similar dynamic of mixed preferences is visible in
the case of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF; for more
details see Howarth & Quaglia, 2014, 2016). France’s
preference was for a single European fund that inter-
vened to resolve or recover ailing financial institutions.
Potential debtors favoured a common solution, which
would ease the burden on banks and sovereign states,
as costs would be mutualised through a European fund.
Germany’s preference was to safeguard its small banks,
retain decision-making in the governments’ hands and
have a network of purely national resolution funds
(Barker, Spiegel, & Wagstyl, 2013). Again, Germany
feared that its corporate and savings banks would be
forced to pay for failed banks in the periphery as a com-
mon systemwould not provide the needed incentives for
debtors to restructure their banking sectors (Howarth &
Quaglia, 2014). The compromise reached with Germany
only included 128 larger banks and forced otherMember
States to accept an intergovernmental agreement for the
SRF (Spiegel, 2013).
The compromise included a transitional period of
10 years (later reduced to eight), during which the SRF
would be composed of national compartments. In this
phase, the SRF was intended to be gradually filled with
ex-ante contributions from financial institutions paying
into national resolution funds until reaching a level of
1% of covered deposits (∼€60 billion; Council of the EU,
2020a). Intervention until the end of the transitional
phase would be limited to the collective contributions
of the respective national compartment and the overall
mutualised means available to the SRF at that moment
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(see Table 2). With time, the national intervention quota
reduces, and the mutualised means increase (for more
details see Council of the EU, 2020a).
In this period the costs of assistance would pre-
dominantly be shouldered by the national banking sec-
tor requiring support. Whereas borrowing and transfers
between the national compartments could be under-
taken to have sufficient funds available, the banking sec-
tor receiving support would have to reimburse these
loans or transfers, shielding other states from incur-
ring losses in their compartments. Even though the
Commission was given new competences, the Council
maintained the possibility to object to a mutualisation
(Council of the EU, 2020a).
The compromise on the transitional period followed,
in particular, the German interest in using national reso-
lution funds, including a shareholder bail-in and a reduc-
tion in the number of institutions covered by the SRF.
However, the agreement also favoured the periphery
states’ interest in putting their larger banks under the
umbrella of the Single Resolution Mechanism. The solu-
tion is a middle ground of a purely national and purely
European solution, with safeguards allowing Germany
to shield its banking sector and keep control within the
Council. The SRF followed the logic of the assistance for-
mula with limited liabilities for states, disincentives cou-
pled to its setup and national involvement, as well as
lending via an intermediary.
To make the SRF operational before the transitional
phase ends in 2023, the Eurozone debated a potential
backstop for the SRF. The Council put forward the possi-
bility of using the ESM in the transitional phase in order
to use the SRF’s full capacity before all ex-ante contribu-
tions were collected (Council of the EU, 2013c). However,
the same preferences leading to a semi-European solu-
tion for the SRF also fostered a similar solution for its
backstop. Member States compromised on a system of
bilateral Loan Facility Agreements, allowing for national
bridge financing for their respective shares according to
the intended size of their national compartments. Only
after all means under the liability cascade of the intergov-
ernmental agreement were exhausted, could national
credit lines be drawn which had to be reimbursed in the
medium-term. This meant that governments had to pro-
vide partial bailouts in the transitional period through
a loan to their own SRF compartment, which would
Table 2. ESM instruments and SRF.
Direct
Recapitalisation
ESM (general) Instrument (ESM) SRF Backstop (ESM) Assistance formula
Guarantee Individual Same as ESM By Backstop; before Same as ESM Limited liability
structure guarantees by 2023 through national
Eurozone credit-lines for
Member States compartments
Eligibility for Conditionality Conditionality; National quotas used Reducing risk Disincentives
assistance ex-ante eligibility; before mutualised exposure;
Single Supervisory means; (Conditions to
Mechanism be agreed by
Eurogroup)
Decision- Decision by Same as ESM Decision by SRB By Eurogroup Member States’





Lender ESM, €500 billion ESM, €60 billion Banking sector ESM, limited No direct fiscal
contributions, to €68 billion impact; fiscally
∼€60 billion neutral in
(∼42 billion collected medium-term
10/07/2020*)
Time Permanent Until SRF is Permanent, Permanent Permanent
limitation finalised with ESM transitional period
backstop (2023) of 8 years
* = Source: Single Resolution Board (n.d.).
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lend-on these funds. After the transitional period, the
SRF compartments are supposed tomerge and share the
responsibility for the entire 128 banks. Creditors only
agreed to the use of the ESM as backstop after the tran-
sitional phase elapsed or sufficient progress of reducing
banks’ exposure to risks had been made (Visco, 2019).
Eurozone countries agreed on this in the revised ESM
treaty in 2019 (yet to be ratified), which allowed the ESM
to provide loans to the SRF up to its target level, with a
nominal cap at €68 billion (ESM, 2020b).
The SRF is the first non-state funded assistance instru-
ment with the potential to break the doom loop, how-
ever, the assistance formula upheld in the transitional
period kept the burden on the country with banking sec-
tor difficulties. The intention to freeMember States from
adverse effects of bailouts will only be achieved partially
and gradually in this period. The solution of the tran-
sitional phase was driven by creditors’—and predomi-
nantly Germany’s—preferences, which included limited
national liabilities, pre-requirements in banking super-
vision and bail-ins for SRF interventions. The common
need to freeMember States from thedoom-loop in order
to stabilise the Eurozone allowed for a deeper integra-
tion of support mechanisms favouring the debtors’ posi-
tions. The rules applied in the transitional period under-
lined the strong adherence to disincentives and avoid-
ance of directs costs by creditors, as most solutions only
allowed for partial mutualisation and demanded that
debtor states significantly participate in interventions.
6. Tug of War Continued: Dealing with Covid-19
After having provided immense national stimuli to
their economies in order to counter the economic
effect of Covid-19 (Anderson et al., 2020), several
countries, including Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Slovenia,
Luxembourg, and Belgium called for action in the form of
a common EU debt instrument, allowing for assistance
in form of grants (Dombey, Chazan, & Brunsden, 2020).
The economic argument for the common European inter-
est put forward was that the pandemic was symmetrical
and that all states, regardless of their policies, were fac-
ing difficulties. However, most creditor states preferred
the ESM as a potential resolution tool, which still had
more than €400 billion of its capacity on standby.
The two camps agreed in April 2020 at the Eurogroup
inclusive format on a ‘comprehensive economic pol-
icy response,’ a mix of EU budget allocations, national
guarantees for European Investment Bank activity, and
adjustment to ESM use. The ESM was allowed to pro-
vide credit lines of up to 2% of Eurozone GDP (€240 bil-
lion) which had to be spent on direct or indirect health-
related expenditure (Council of the EU, 2020b). A new
loan mechanism, SURE, was introduced at the EU level,
which allowed the EU to borrow and on-lend €100 bil-
lion to Member States. The only condition was that the
national government expenditure on short-time work
and similar schemes increased since February 2020.
As of January 2021, the Council approved assistance
to 18 governments via SURE with the largest share going
to Italy (€27,4 billion) and Spain (€21,3 billion). The reg-
ulation worked with voluntary national guarantees of
€25 billion to ensure the full capacitywith beneficial lend-
ing rates,whichwas considered an ‘important expression
of solidarity’ (European Commission, 2020a). Creditors
adhered to the assistance formula via intermediary loans
to avoid incurring direct costs and to limit their risk expo-
sure in time through temporary instruments. The big con-
cession on their part was the easing of conditionality for
assistance, which was intended to encourage debtors to
make use of the loans.
In May 2020, as the Commission projected a record
economic decline in the EU, the periphery countries, but
also France, refused to rely on support via Eurozone
financial assistance instruments and French president
Macron referred to the ESM instruments as throwing
‘fake money’ at the problem (Khan & Brunsden, 2020).
The issue was that loans alone did not help already
highly indebted countries as their fiscal sustainability
was under threat and the ESM’s senior creditor status
could have negative effects on market lending rates.
After the Commission’s forecast, a Franco-German initia-
tive proposed a €500 billion grant-based recovery fund
for the EU, raised on the markets and funded by an
increase in the EU’s own resources and a fair taxation
of the digital economy (Présidence de la République,
2020). This U-turn from the German government was
defended as necessary solidarity, given that loans would
not help countries with already high debt and that eco-
nomic cohesion would have been severely disrupted
(Bundeskanzlerin, 2020). German members of parlia-
ment argued that it was in Germany’s interest to
strengthen its EU neighbours due to its strong export-led
market (Bundestag, 2020).
On the other hand, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, and Austria (referred to as ‘the frugal four’)
proposed only using loans for support (Rijksoverheid,
2020). In late May, the Commission combined both in
a proposed recovery fund worth €750 billion (European
Commission, 2020b). The dynamic was not creditor and
debtor per se but between frugal states and a Franco-
German-led coalition. The outcome of a record 4-day
negotiation was a middle ground between both camps
with a Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) worth
€360 billion in loans and €312,5 billion in grants (Council
of the EU, 2020c).
The Covid-19 overall response (see Table 3) is a step
away from the previous application of assistance through
conditional loans with disincentives. Even though grants
were introduced and disincentives predominantly abol-
ished, the regulation of the RRF referred to sound
economic governance as part of the ex-post eligibility
criteria. Thus, creditors upheld some form of conditional-
ity. They also ensured theminimisation of direct national
costs and limited liability for mutual support. The largest
share of around €1 trillion worth of intended assistance
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Table 3. Covid-19 assistance tools.
EU RRF Credit-line (ESM) SURE Assistance formula
Eligibility for Recovery and Resilience Plans (including Increased Healthcare, cure Soft conditionality
assistance sound economic governance) short-time and prevention
work schemes
Guarantee Guaranteed by extraordinary EU Individual Guaranteed by Limited liability
structure expenditure guarantees by EU budget
the Eurozone
Member States
Decision- Council Predetermined Decision on Decision on Member States’
making implementing allocation of assistance assistance taken control
decision, limited to grants taken by within the Council
6,8% of respective Eurogroup
national GNI
Lender EU, €360 billion EU grants, ESM, Limited EU, Limited to Mix: direct fiscal
€312,5 billion to €240 billion €75 billion, impact for Member
voluntary national States (grants),
guarantees for partially no fiscal




Time Until 2027 Until 2027 End of 2022 December 2022 Temporary
limitation
followed the previous assistance formula including tem-
porary instruments in the formof intermediary loans hav-
ing no direct fiscal impact and some conditions attached.
7. Conclusion
By applying the theoretical premise of liberal intergov-
ernmentalism, this article provides one possible explana-
tory track on how the Eurozone has reformed in the area
of financial assistance since 2010. The re-occurring pat-
tern of common Eurozone interests and cost-benefit con-
siderations of creditors and debtors led to a repeated
tug of war over the detailed reforms of assistance, while
both sides still tried to resolve the common difficulties at
hand. These situations of mixed preferences are one way
of understanding the interstate bargaining process over
policies with potentially high costs for Member States.
Creditors’ preferences were decisive for reforms in
terms of disincentives, limited liability for common debt,
and the adherence to intermediary borrowing and lend-
ing to minimise direct costs. They repeatedly favoured
national safeguards and the use of loans. Control and
some disincentives were held on to, which reduced the
effectiveness of the assistance formula and only partially
allowed for a slow de-nationalisation of assistance in the
case of bank-related support. Through the enabling fac-
tor of common EU and Eurozone interests, debtors were
able to push for softening of moral hazard elements and
an expansion of the assistance into areas of banking sec-
tor support. The common interest was also decisive for
Germany and other creditors to support grants.
This explains why financial assistance, even though
increasing in size and in areas of applicability since 2010,
was often accompanied by a reduced involvement for
creditors, a temporary form of instruments, and rein-
forced disincentives for debtors. Apart from disagree-
ment on detailed application of EU and Eurozone assis-
tance, one should however not ignore the increased
volume of assistance available since the beginning of
the Euro crisis, which today stands at a total capacity of
around €1,3 trillion and is at least partially permanent.
While some instruments are certainly more appealing
for debtors than others, assistance continued to be pro-
vided to a larger extent in the form of loans. The com-
bination of loans and grants, as well as the general risks
carried by all Member States associated with assistance,
indicates the commitment to the European project and
underlines the institutionalised shared European and
Eurozone interests.
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